AA. Lead, by C. E. Siebenthal (July 30, 1917 In September, 1914, soon after the beginning of the war in Europe, the Director of the United States Geological Survey summarized the mineral reserves of the United States and made certain suggestions as to nfaking America industrially independent. 1 At that time, two and one-half years before the United States became involved in the war, it was clearly recognized that this country would soon have to face unusual conditions resulting from the depletion or exhaustion of her stocks of imported minerals. Many of these minerals had been imported from choice rather than from necessity, or at least they had been imported when their cost was less than the cost of domestic materials, or because their quality was presumably more desirable, or because their ports of importation were more, convenient to the consumers, or for other commercial reasons, and consequently for such minerals it required only the development of an American industry to render our potential supplies available.
In keeping up the supply of minerals that are admittedly lacking or are found in inadequate quantities in the United States a more difficult problem had to be solved. As the war in Europe progressed and ocean commerce became more and more unsettled the difficulty of obtaining supplies of certain minerals increased, and the Geological Survey was called upon by the public and by other Government bureaus for an ever-increasing amount of information and advice concerning these minerals, and also concerning the commercial situation with regard to other more plentiful minerals and their derivatives.
In order to meet this demand with published information a series of papers was prepared by the members of the Survey staff who were most familiar with the minerals required. These papers, collectively entitled "Our mineral supplies," were issued separately in the order i Smith, G. O., Our mineral reserves: U. S. Geol. Survey Bull. 599, 48 pp., 1914. ., 5
of their completion. The first one, on chromite, appeared on April 13, 1917, one week after the United States entered the war. All but two of the chapters were available in 1917. The chapter on quicksilver was delayed owing to other demands on the author to whom it was first assigned, although the essential data were given to the war boards informally and served their purpose. In order to complete the series for publication the preparation of this chapter was assigned to Mr. Kansome in September, 1918. The bibliography, compiled under the direction of the Survey editor, affords a convenient check list of the Survey publications on the minerals considered in this volume.
In so far as practicable each chapter contains a discussion of the source of supply of the mineral considered, its uses, both in peace and in war, and the normal demand, and for some of the minerals the probable demand under war conditions is indicated. The table of contents (p. 3) shows the chapters prepared for this bulletin, their authors, and the dates of publication.
The importance of national independence, in mineral supplies both in peace and in war needs no demonstration here. In times of peace industrial independence for the United States requires domestic control of such resources as coal, iron ore, and petroleum. Other commodities may in part be imported advantageously because of cheaper sources of foreign supply or superiority of foreign grades, and still others may be almost wholly imported because of lack of known or developed domestic sources of supply. In war times, however, with foreign supplies cut off through hostilities between nations and also by hindrances to commerce, the importance of independence, potential at least, in minerals of all classes becomes most impressive. o The, lesson that has been pointed out by recent events is that the.discovery and development for war purposes of mineral supplies in which the United States is deficient should be undertaken by the Federal Government.
As shown in the several chapters the domestic supplies of minerals may be divided into three classes (1) mineral supplies that are adequate to all probable peace and war needs of the United States; (2) mineral supplies that are sufficient for a large part of these needs; (3) mineral supplies that are inadequate in quantity or quality, or both, the lack of which must be offset by imports, use of substitutes, or curtailment of use. Among the materials to be grouped in the first class are arsenic, barytes, bauxite, bismuth, bromine, calcium chloride, cement, clay, coal, copper, corundum and emery, diatomaceous earth, feldspar, fluorspar, garnet, gravel, grindstones, gypsum, iron ore, lead, lime, lithium minerals, magnesite, manganiferous ores (low grade), molybdenum., petroleum, phosphate rock, pulpstones, salt, silica, talc and soapstone, sulphur, tripoli, volcanic . 7
ash,: and zinc;, in the second class are antimony, mercury (quicksilver), mica, pyrite, strontium, tungsten, and vanadium; and in the third class are asbestos, chromite, graphite, manganese ore (high grade), monazite, nickel, nitrates, platinum, potash, and tin. As all the chapters except that on quicksilver were prepared in the spring, of 1917, their authors had only the statistics of 1916 available for comparison. Developments during 1917 and 1918 furnish a better indication of the needs, of the United States under war conditions than those of earlier years, and inasmuch as the delay in completing the series of chapters permits this introduction to be brought up to a later date a comparison is possible between the quantity of supplies available in a normal pre-war year,, such as 1913, and a war year, such as 1917.
The following tables of commodities, by classes 1, 2, and 3 as defined above, show for most of the important commodities in 1913 and 1917 the domestic production, the imports, and the exports, from which may be deduced the approximate quantity available for domestic consumption. The figures for a few commodities are confidential and may not be published. 
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[ 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 1917 1913 11917 '1913 1917 1913 11917 [1913 1917 Production. The reaction, of the war upon the demand for the several commodities is of interest. In abrasives, chemical materials, fertilizers, fuels, metals, and refractories, with few exceptions, domestic production was greater in 1917 than in 1913, whereas the output of structural materials was generally less. The classes of materials whose domestic production increased-were all directly or indirectly contributory to the conduct of the war; the civil consumption of certain materials was less than normal because of governmental restrictions in use and because of high prices, but the military uses more than made up the deficiency. Inspection of the table shows also that of a few commodities the quantity available for consumption in 1917 was less than in 1913 on account of curtailment of imports, notwithstanding considerable increases in domestic production.
In any consideration of mineral supplies the actual consumption is all-important. The last column of each table shows the quantities available for consumption as calculated by adding production and imports and subtracting exports. These quantities may be very different, especially in war times, from the quantities actually consumed, because stocks accumulated in a former year may be heavily drawn upon. More complete data on stocks and on actual consumption of materials, even in peace times, are needed. As estimates of military needs alone and of shipping available have varied greatly and have been revised from time to time during the war, it is evident that consumption must vary, and a consideration of all factors shows that circumstances may at any time lead to the transfer of mineral commodities from one classification to another. For example, data originally made available to the war boards by consumers, combined with other data at hand, indicated at one time a serious shortage in supplies of chromite. Production was encouraged, imports were permitted to a certain extent, and conservation in consumption of the chromite available was attained, but these measures combined led to an actual oversupply and corresponding distress to the producers who were operating under war-tune costs and who failed, at least in part, to receive the expected corresponding war-time prices.
Similarly, quality is often a factor as important as quantity in reckoning our independence of foreign supplies. For example, it was found necessary to import certain quantities of graphite, mica, asbestos, and several other minerals because for some uses the quality of the domestic material, no matter what the quantity, was not adapted to particular needs, whether of war or of peace.
On the whole, the severe test of war has shown that the United States possesses a larger degree of independence in mineral supplies than any other nation, especially in times when cost of production has been relegated to the rear. In peace times cost is of course a determining factor, and a number of mineral industries that have thrived under war conditions are already declining under the pinch of foreign competition and decreased demand.
It is to be regretted that data on consumption and on cost of production have never been available in any Government organization in such completeness as the data on production compiled in the Geological Survey and the data on imports and exports compiled in. the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. It is to be hoped that means may be found to remedy these deficiencies and to improve related data already provided for, in order that more exact knowledge may be available for better preparedness in the future.
The cost of the war has been great, in blood and in treasure. The tuition fees that must be paid for the lessons that have been taught by national unpreparedness are so heavy that they must be borne in part by future generations. It will be unfortunate indeed if these lessons are not fully learned and applied in practice.
